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In 2005, the Bank of Russia has made three announcements that indicate an increasing role for 
the euro in the Russian exchange rate strategy. On February 4 2005 the Bank of Russia 
announced that it has started to stabilize the daily volatilities of the Russian ruble against a 
dollar-euro currency basket. While the announced weight of the euro was 10% (90% dollar) by 
then, the Bank of Russia increased this weight to currently 40% within ten months. Bank of 
Russia representatives have stressed the intention to increase the weight of the euro the Russian 
currency basket further up to 50% but without indicating a specific time horizon. Other 
statements of Bank of Russia representatives have stressed the rising role of euro as intervention 
and reserve currency. This paper reviews the recent trends in Russian exchange rate strategy with 
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1. The Euro as Anchor, Reserve, and Intervention Currency in Russia 
 
Since 2001, the Russian authorities have taken several steps in increasing the role of the euro in 
its exchange rate policies. In February 2003, the policy of a tightly managed float against the US 
dollar was complemented by the explicit objective to limit the real appreciation of the ruble 
against a multi-currency basket comprising the currencies of Russia’s main trading partners. The 
euro area countries, and hence the euro, were given a weight of roughly 36%. Furthermore, there 
is evidence of a growing role of the euro as international currency in Russia. This refers to the 
role of the euro as anchor, intervention and reserve currency. 
 
(1) The authorities diversified the currency composition of their increasing international reserve 
assets, with the share of the euro rising from less than 10% to 33% by Sept. 2005
1, thereby 
increasing the role of the euro as reserve currency.
2 This implies that in absolute terms, the Bank 
of Russia in the first week of September 2005 held euro denominated assets of 40 billion euros. 
 
(2) On February 4 2005 the Bank of Russia announced that it has started to stabilize the daily 
volatilities of the Russian ruble against a dollar-euro currency basket. While the announced 
weight of the euro was 10% (90% dollar) by then, Bank of Russia representatives stressed the 
intention to increase the weight of the euro gradually up to 50%. Since then, the announced 
weight of the euro in the Russian day-to-day currency basket has been increased step-by-step to 
20% (March 15), 30% (May 16), 35% (August 1) and 40% (December 4).  
 
(3) On August 26 2005 the Bank of 
Russia announced that it had begun 
official ruble/euro operations in foreign 
exchange markets on August 25 in 
support of the currency basket and “to 
wean the market off its fixation with the 
dollar.” 
 
Figure 1 plots the (Bloomberg quoted) 
ruble/dollar rate and ruble/dollar rate 
calculated based on a standard formula of 
                                                      
1   The structure of reserves may mirror the composition of the currency basket. 
2   The shares of other currencies in Russia’s foreign reserves are 60% US dollar and 7% British pound according to Alexei 











01/02/05 01/04/05 01/06/05 01/08/05 01/10/05 01/12/05
arithmetic average I
Bloomberg quoted rate
Figure 1: Calculation of the Currency Basket
(ruble/dollar)
Own calculations.  3
a currency basket (arithmetic average based on price notation). It suggests that in a first phase 
after the basket strategy was announced on February 1, the calculated basket did not correspond 
to the spot ruble/dollar rate. It followed ruble fluctuations against the dollar, but the Russian 
authorities allowed for more appreciation of the ruble than suggested by the basket formula. Yet, 
since mid June 2005 there has been a close relationship between the currency basket and the 
(Bloomberg quoted) market rate. This implies that the ruble exchange rate is stable against the 
basket since then. 
 
 The step to operate in and to further develop the ruble/euro foreign exchange market is in line 
with the strategy to strengthen the role of the 
euro in the Russian exchange rate strategy. In 
first half of 2005, the dollar made up about 
99% of ruble/foreign currency trading volume 
at the Uniform Trade Session. As shown in 
Figure 2, in the past the bid-ask spreads in 
euro/ruble market have been considerably 
higher than in the ruble/dollar market. 
However, recently declining (increasing) 
bid/ask spreads in the ruble/euro (ruble/dollar) 
market may reflect increasing (decreasing) 
liquidity.
3 Since July 2005 bid/ask spreads in 
the ruble/dollar market have been substantially 
higher than in the ruble/euro market. Private 
agents who maintain business relations with 
the euro area or countries pegging their currencies to the euro may benefit from lower risk and 
transactions costs. The Russian monetary authorities seem decisive to increase the public and 
private use of the euro. 
 
2. Operation of the Basket 
It is difficult to choose the optimal  composition of the currency basket. Traditionally 
international trade has been the dominant determinant of a basket’s currency structure. However, 
as stressed by First Deputy Chairman Ulyukayev, a purely trade weighted currency basket would 
give only a small weight to the US dollar of about 5%, because Russian trade linkages with the 
US are weak. If dollarization of international payments flows (invoicing)
4 is considered, the US 
                                                      
3   In June 2005, in the MICEX Currency Market Section, trading began in ruble/euro instruments in accordance with new rules 
which enabled to extend the time of trading, launch new euro instruments and adopt risk management systems similar to 
those used in trading the US dollar. 
4   For instance, most of trade with (East) Asia as well as intra-CIS trade is likely to be invoiced in dollars (McKinnon and 
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Figure 2: Ruble Bid/Ask Spreads  
(as percent of average rate)
Source: Bloomberg. Two month weekly averages.  4
dollar weight would increase to 50%.
5 This number corresponds to the target for the gradual 
increase of the euro weight in the Russian currency basket as officially announced in early 2005. 
In addition, as outlined in section 3, also financial flows and possibly considerations about 
macroeconomic stabilization may matter in determining the weights of the basket. 
 
Given the publicly announced weights there 
are three ways of calculating a basket 
(Takagi 1986). The basket can be compiled 
using geometric averages, arithmetic 
averages based on price notations against the 
reference currency (arithmetic average I) as 
well as arithmetic averages based on volume 
notations (arithmetic average II).
6 The 
geometric calculation method has the 
advantage of leaving the announced weights 
unchanged. In contrast, arithmetic averages 
lead to “de facto” varying weights while the 
quantities of reference currencies in the 
basket remain constant. According to the 
Bank of Russia, it uses the arithmetic 
weighted average based on price notations (arithmetic average I).  
 
This implies the following procedure: (1) The basket currencies and the specific weights – by 15 
December 2005 40% euro and 50% dollar – are announced. (2) Given the initial exchange rates 
of ruble and euro in price notation against the dollar (as the reference currency) the quantities of 
each currency in the basket are determined. These quantities depend on the announced weights 
as well as the initial exchange rates of the domestic (ruble) and basket currencies (euro and 
dollar) against the reference currency (dollar) in price notation in period t0.
7 With x$ and x€ 









x =  and  (1)  
                                                      
5   In specific, oil and gas exports which make up over 50% of Russia’s exports are overwhelmingly invoiced in US dollar. 
6    An illustrative example is provided in the appendix. The differences in the calculations based on the three averages 
(geometric, arithmetic I, arithmetic II) are marginal for the new Russian currency basket. 
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Figure 3: Fixed Quantities
(units of dollars and euros)









x = .     (2) 
 
The basket will contain x$ units of dollars and x€ units of euros. These quantities remain 
unchanged (fixed quantities) until the officially announced weights are changed. The fixed 
quantities for the Russian euro-dollar basket are shown in Figure 3.
8  
 
 (3) Based on the fixed quantities, the value 
of the domestic currency in terms of US 
dollar (in price notation) can be calculated as 
the sum of the two components x$ and x€ 
multiplied by the exchange rate of the basket 
currencies against the dollar respectively 
(price notations). While the multiplier for 
the dollar as the reference currency is 1 (see 
Table 1), the value of the basket changes due 
to exchange rate changes between euro and 
dollar. The respective announced and de 
facto weights of the euro are shown in 
Figure 4. As observed since March 2005, the 
depreciation of the euro against the dollar 
increased the de facto weight of the euro in the Russian currency basket while the major increase 
in the de facto euro weight was due to the upward adjustment of the announced weights.
9  
 
An example for the calculation of a ruble currency basket on 2 August 2005 (with reference to 1 




                                                      
8   One advantage of the fixed quantities (in comparison to the geometric average) is that a direct link to the forward market of 
the basket currencies is established. This may be important for Russia because domestic capital markets are underdeveloped 
and the foreign exchange risk of short-term payment flows therefore usually remains unhedged. 
9   The variability of the de facto weights of dollar and euro in the Russian currency baskets explain the assertion of First Deputy 
Chairman Ulyukayev at a press conference on 22 June 2005 that the weight of the euro in the Russian currency basket is 
higher than the—by then—announced 30%. The calculated value of 31.6% for June 22 is nevertheless considerably lower 
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Own calculations.  6

















$  Rate 
Change  
Dollar  65% 18.19  1  18.19  63.42%   Aug 
1  Euro  35% 12.78  0.8211  10.49  36.58%  
 Ruble/Dollar      28.68    
Dollar  65% 18.19  1  18.19  63.44% 0  Aug 
2  Euro  35% 12.78  0.8202 10.48  36.56%  -0.04% 
 Ruble/Dollar    28.67   -0.02% 
Note:  Italics indicate fixed values. 
& Calculated based on equation (1) and (2) using price 
notations. The fixed quantities since February 1 2005 are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
3. The Rational for the Move to the Euro 
 
Although the Russian monetary authorities have indicated that they might adopt an inflation 
targeting framework in the longer term, it is 
likely that the exchange rate will remain the 
main objective of Russian monetary policy in 
the short- to medium term.
10 Besides reasons 
related to international trade, capital markets 
matter:
11 First, underdeveloped capital markets 
do not provide instruments to hedge for the 
foreign exchange risk of international capital 
and payment flows. Second, an 
underdeveloped domestic government bond 
market hampers monetary policy making 
based on domestic assets. 
In the past, exchange rate stability against the 
dollar has been in line with dollar invoicing of 
                                                      
10   In a presentation of monetary policy in 1999-2005 the Bank of Russia is stating the intention to gradually scale down its 
presence on the foreign exchange market and to switch to a free float and full convertibility in 2007. 
11   The impact of underdeveloped capital markets on short-term and long-term exchange rate stabilization is elaborated by 





































foreign currency deposits (left scale)
ruble/dollar (right scale)
Figure 5: Russian Foreign Currency Deposits
(percent of overall deposits)
Source: IMF.  7
raw material exports (oil and gas account for more than 50% of total Russian exports) and the 
dollarization of the financial system.
12 Beyond raw material exports, substantial parts of trade are 
likely to be invoiced in US dollar. External borrowing (and lending) by Russian companies and 
banks continues to be mainly dollar denominated.
13 Intra-regional network externalities in the use 
of the US dollar in the whole CIS enhanced the role of the US dollar as an anchor currency in 
Russia (and the CIS).
14  
 
The decision of the Russian monetary authorities to give a higher weight to the euro in its 
exchange rate strategy may reflect an increasing awareness of Russia’s (geographical) position 
between the two major currency blocs, i.e. the dollar bloc
15 and the euro area as well as a number 
of Central and Eastern European countries pegging their currencies to the euro. In specific, a 
more substantial weight of the euro in the Russian exchange rate strategy can be motivated by 
the developments in the goods and capital markets as well as by macroeconomic stabilization.  
 
As about 50% of Russian trade are with the EU25, a higher weight of the euro in the Russian 
exchange rate strategy would mitigate fluctuations of competitiveness for Russian exports and 
for domestic enterprises competing with imports from the euro area arising from fluctuations in 
the USD/EUR exchange rate. Besides international trade, capital flows have become an 
important determinant of exchange rate stabilization. Because financial linkages with the euro 
area are strengthening, more exchange stability against the euro could reduce the foreign 
exchange risk for short-term and long-term payment flows between Russia and the euro area 
(and the countries pegging to the euro), provided that Russian borrowers would denominate an 
increasing share of their external borrowing (and lending) in euro. 
 
Furthermore, considerations related to domestic macroeconomic stabilisation might have 
influenced the decision to adopt a dollar-euro currency basket. Starting in 2001 a sharp decline 
of US interest rates to historically low levels was accompanied by global depreciation pressure 
on the dollar resulting in fast reserve accumulation and monetary expansion in the countries 
pegging their exchange rates to the dollar. In Russia, the Ukraine and other CIS countries dollar 
reserve accumulation contributed to accelerating inflation and thereby real appreciation starting 
                                                      
12   While there are no data available for Russia, Ukrainian data on trade invoicing (goods and services) show that in the first 9 
months of 2004 about 80% of trade were settled in US dollar, about 6% in euro. 
13   Due to sizeable fiscal surpluses there has not been a sovereign bond issuance since the 1998 financial crisis. 
14   Schnabl (2005a) explores the network externalities of the common use of the dollar in the highly economically integrated 
CIS. 
15   The dollar bloc is defined as the US and the countries pegging their exchange rates to the dollar, in particular (East) Asia and 
the Middle East.   8
from 2004.
16 To this end, the adoption of a basket would be equivalent to diversifying the risk of 
undue monetary expansion in the anchor countries. 
 
Finally, the partial shift towards the euro as an anchor currency is facilitated by the fact that 
since 2001 the sustained appreciation pressure on the ruble has contributed to the de-





The increasing role of the euro for the Russian exchange rate policy has implications (1) for the 
Russian monetary and exchange rate policy, (2) for the ruble exchange rate behaviour against 
euro and dollar, as well as (3) for the international role of the euro. 
 
(1) If Russia continues to follow a strict basket strategy as suggested by Figure 1 Russian 
monetary and exchange rate policy would be solely focused on one target, i.e. tight exchange 
rate stabilization against two currencies. In cases of conflict between the different targets, 
inflation targeting and real exchange rate targeting would be incompatible with the strict peg to 
the basket. 
 
(2) The basket strategy with (further) increasing (decreasing) weights of euro (dollar) is 
equivalent to declining (increasing) day-to-day exchange rate volatility against the euro (dollar). 
As suggested by Figure 5 short-term day-to-day volatility and long-term fluctuations of the ruble 
have been closely intertwined in the past. For this reason we would expect less (more) long-term 
fluctuations of the ruble (level) against the euro (dollar). 
 
(3) Despite the announcement by the Bank of Russia to operate in the ruble/euro foreign 
exchange market and despite the fact that a higher share of euro reserves facilitates occasional 
euro interventions, the euro may not be used systematically as a second intervention currency. 
For this purpose the Bank of Russia would have to establish firm intervention targets for both the 
euro and the dollar. Speculation would be invited when the dollar/euro rate is moving. Thus, the 
                                                      
16   The Russian monetary authorities sterilized parts of the monetary effects of foreign currency purchases by depositing oil 
revenues with the central bank (partly) via the so-called stabilization fund. Nevertheless, in emerging markets and developing 
countries complete sterilization of capital inflows is unlikely because this would require rising interest rates and therefore 
rising sterilization costs and economic slow down. Furthermore, rising interest rates would encourage new capital inflows 
which counteract sterilization. In the case of Russia, the sterilization of capital inflows via government deposits at the Bank 
of Russia has opportunity costs as remuneration is low. 
17   In the past, a high-level of deposit dollarisation as well as significant holdings of US dollar cash by Russian citizens was 
named by the authorities as an argument in favour of a US dollar focused exchange rate policy.   9
dollar is likely to remain the main intervention currency.
18 This does not exclude, however, that 
the euro may become the main intervention currency in the long-term if the trade and financial 
linkages with the euro area and the countries pegging their exchange rates to the euro continue to 
expand.  
 
Nevertheless, the role of the euro as the main intervention currency is linked to the role of the 
euro as reserve currency. With the dollar as main intervention currency, interventions in US 
dollar increase the share of the US dollar in total reserves. To sustain the share of the euro in 
foreign reserves, the Bank of Russia has to acquire euro reserves either via dollar/euro 
transactions or—possibly increasingly—by direct ruble/euro transactions. 
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The international role of the euro in Russia is likely to increase, as the Russian monetary 
authorities are using increasingly the euro as anchor, intervention and reserve currency. For the 
first time the euro is gaining ground as an international currency in a major country which does 
not strive to join the European Union. Russia has about million 145 inhabitants and the GDP 
                                                      
18   Deputy Chairman Korishchenko confirmed on August 26 that the dollar remains the core of the local currency market “where 
the situation determines the official exchange rate of the ruble and the scale of possible intervention operations by the 
Russian Central Bank.”.   10
amounts to 580 billions dollars, which is equivalent to the total GDP of all ten New Member 
States. Provided that transactions costs for euro-invoiced/denominated trade and capital flows 
decline, the private use of the euro is likely to increase.
19 
 
Beyond Russia, other CIS countries (133 million inhabitants, 173 billion dollars GDP) may 
follow the Russian exchange rate strategy to maintain intra-CIS exchange rate stability, as the 
CIS countries are highly regionally integrated (Schnabl 2005a).
20 For instance, while Ukraine is 
(still) adhering to a tight dollar peg, pegging to the euro or a currency basket is discussed. Private 
agents in the CIS countries can be expected to follow once the official exchange rate strategies 
have changed. 
 
While strengthening trade and financial links with the euro area and other countries stabilizing 
their exchange rate to the euro might support such a trend, it could be counteracted by growing 
trade and financial flows with East Asia where international and intra-regional trade and 
payments flows are mostly dollar invoiced and dollar denominated. Alternatively the Asian 
countries may adopt similar baskets strategies (including the Japanese yen as an anchor 




In contrast to the East Asian countries such as Korea, Thailand and Singapore that have also 
been pursuing basket strategies with undisclosed weights and small (but increasing) weights for 
other currencies than the dollar,
21 Russia has been transparent in announcing and implementing 
the currency basket. In line with the increasing role of the euro as an anchor currency, the role of 
the euro as reserve and intervention currency is on the rise. The transparency adopted by the 
Russian authorities rules out other targets of monetary policy making such as inflation targeting 
and real exchange rate targeting. The change in the strategy may provide considerable incentives 
to private agents to increase the use of the euro along the shift in its public use. This is likely to 
enhance the international role of the euro in both Russia and the CIS countries which may be 
inclined to follow the Russian exchange rate strategy to maintain intra-regional exchange rate 
stability. 
 
                                                      
19   In several Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania, shifts in official exchange rate policies have 
triggered moves in the private use of international currencies, from the US dollar to the euro. 
20   See the section on the CIS in the ECB Monthly Bulletin article of October 2004 on “Economic Integration in Selected 
Regions outside the European Union”. 
21   Some East Asian countries are equilibrating competitiveness between yen and dollar giving a weight to the Japanese yen up 
to about 20% (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004). Schnabl 2005b compares the exchange rate strategies in the CIS and East Asia. 
In contrast, China seems to maintain a tight peg to the dollar with reference to a basket of currencies.   11
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Appendix: 
To calculate the parity of the ruble against the dollar (reference currency) the example refers to 
the intial weights of euro and dollar in the Russian currency basket, i.e. 10% and 90% 
respectively. The exchange rate of the euro in terms of one dollar is assumed to appreciate 
(depreciate) from 1 euro per dollar to 0.8 (1.2) euro per dollar. If the value of the basket before 
the euro/dollar exchange rate change is assumed 1 the new basket value can be calculated as 
shown in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Calculation of Currency Baskets based on Different Averages 
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  2.44% 1.69% 
 
As shown above the “de facto” weights of the basket currencies would change differently with 
respect to the respective exchange rate changes. 
 
 